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ABSTRACT
The Changing Dynamics of Coattails in 
Senate Elections
by
Sheila Dubron Lambert
Dr. David Damore, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The prevailing theoretical approach in political science has been to 
analyze presidential coattails from a top down perspective focusing on the 
effect that presidential elections have on congressional outcomes. 
Presidential coattail research has been limited in scope to coattails as a 
one-way causation often examining variables in isolation, rarely 
accounting for the complex nature of elections and competing forces that 
influence elections across various levels of campaigns. This research 
seeks to present a more realistic view of campaign processes by 
assessing the spillover effects that campaign activity for one race may 
have on other races occurring simultaneously. Specifically, this thesis 
considers the factors that shape the context in which presidential and 
senatorial campaigns are occurring. This thesis builds upon prior
III
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research to offer a state-level analysis of Senate elections and analyze the 
upward impact Senate elections may have on the vote for President.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The 2004 Florida election was the scene of a very competitive open seat 
Senate race between Mel Martinez (R) and Betty Castor (D), which resulted in a 
narrow victory of 50% for Martinez. The Florida presidential election was just as 
close with George Bush, the Republican candidate for president, receiving 52% 
of the vote and John Kerry, the Democrat received 47% of the vote. In 1996, the 
Florida presidential vote went to the Democratic presidential candidate, while the 
2000 presidential vote was virtually a tie, with each candidate receiving 48.8 
percent of the vote. The 2004 campaign effects should have been a wash in 
terms of support for the presidential candidate, but the competitive relationship 
between the vote for president and Senate in Florida may have helped the 
incumbent presidential candidate win the state.
The 2004 election Nevada election proved somewhat less dramatic. Bush 
received 50% of the Nevada presidential vote, while Kerry received 48% of the 
vote. This vote was in stark contrast to the votes in the Nevada Senate election. 
The Democrat Senator, Harry Reid, received 61% of the vote, while the 
Republican challenger, Richard Ziser, received only 35% of the vote. Research 
suggested that the close marginality for Senator Reid's 1998 Senate race, with a 
difference of less than one percent, would create the backdrop for a quality
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
challenger to emerge. Richard Ziser, however, with no previous political 
experience was not a quality challenger and was unable to mount a viable 
financial challenge to match the financial reserves of Senator Reid.
The Nevada election proved significant for other reasons. Nevada is 
considered a swing state, and in 2004 was kept in the undecided column for 
much of the election. Political pundits suggested that policy factors such as the 
war in Iraq or local issues such as the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste depository 
would help the Kerry/Edwards ticket. However, there were other considerations 
that influenced the vote in Nevada to a greater degree. Nevada had one of the 
lowest unemployment rates, one of the fastest growing populations and strong 
support for the war in Iraq. These factors proved to be more important in 
deciding the election. Presidential ratings and economic factors set the backdrop 
for presidential campaigns to play a big role by effecting whether or not quality 
candidates emerge. While all the indicators suggested that Reid would face a 
strong competitive challenger from the incumbent president’s party, he did not. 
Thus, because the Senate race was not competitive it had no effect on the 
presidential race as evidenced by the similar presidential vote difference in 2000 
and 2004.’
Political science research has long sought to explain or predict election 
results. It is the vote choice on Election Day that defines the United States 
political system. Political scholars have structured this explanation by specifying 
which campaign variables have the biggest effect or any effect at all. Those
 ̂George Bush received 50% of Nevada’s presidential vote in 2000 and 50.7% of Nevada’s 
presidential vote in 2004.
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variables have included campaign fundraising, media, and prior political 
experience to name just a few. Research has tended to examine these factors in 
isolation, rarely accounting for the complex nature of elections and the competing 
forces that influence elections across various levels of campaigns occurring 
simultaneously.
The primary contention of this thesis is that campaign activity at one level 
affects the campaign dynamics at other levels. This study differs from other 
research by attempting to untangle this process by analyzing the effect that 
campaign activity and the competitiveness of Senate elections exert on state 
level outcomes. More specifically, the research question posited here is under 
what conditions will Senate campaigns affect the statewide presidential vote?
Political science research typically explains elections from a top-down 
approach, focusing on the result that presidential elections have on 
congressional outcomes. These studies do not explain the potential power that 
lower level races have on the vote for President. Specifically, this study will build 
upon prior research to analyze under what conditions Senate elections effect the 
vote for President. As such, this research seeks to present a more realistic view 
of campaign processes by assessing the spillover effects that campaign activity 
for one race may have on other races occurring contemporaneously. That is, 
whereas prior research tends to consider races occurring at different levels (e.g., 
local, state, or national) as separate phenomenon, this effort untangles the 
effects that campaign activity targeted at one level (e.g., campaigns for the 
United States Senate) may have on campaigns occurring simultaneously (e.g.,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the presidential elections). The remainder of the thesis is organized as outlined 
below.
Chapter two presents an evaluation of current and past research on 
presidential and Senate campaigns, as well as a review of larger theories of 
campaigns and elections. Specifically, the chapter reviews prior work examining 
presidential elections, presidential coattail theories, and the dynamics of Senate 
and House elections. Additionally, chapter two includes a discussion of previous 
campaign research, which focuses on whether campaign matters as well as 
national and state level variables that effect elections.
The thesis's theory and hypotheses are presented in chapter three. 
Specifically, the theory assesses the factors that affect challenger quality and 
competitiveness, as well as national and local factors that shape the context in 
which presidential and senatorial campaigns are occurring. To assess the 
influence of macro level variables, the thesis modifies Holbrook’s (1991) model of 
state level presidential voting. By modifying Holbrook’s model and incorporating 
variables such as presidential campaign activity, this thesis hopes to determine 
the level of support a presidential candidate may receive from a Senate election 
on a state-by-state basis. These modifications will allow this thesis to untangle 
and analyze the various components of national and state specific factors 
effecting elections. The theory also builds on the work of Jacobsen (2000) by 
examining how national conditions affect the emergence of observable measures 
of campaign competitiveness.
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The research design, including data and measurement, are discussed in 
chapter four. Specifically, to test the hypotheses suggested in chapter three, data 
for all Senate elections occurring between 1988 and 2000 were collected. This 
chapter also explains the selection of regression analysis and the importance of 
using causal modeling to assess processes that unfold over time. The chapter 
also includes detailed discussion of the variables used in the subsequent 
analysis. Chapter five presents the results of the analysis and highlights the key 
findings that suggest Senate elections do affect the vote for president.
Chapter six discusses the findings and implications of this effort. 
Specifically, this study adds to the research by further untangling the role of 
competitiveness and its influence on presidential elections. In doing so, the 
thesis presents an alternative view for conceptualizing and understanding the 
fluidity and multi-level nature of campaign effects.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The general theoretical approach in political science has been to analyze 
the presidential coattail effect as a one-way causal process flowing from 
presidential elections to congressional races and to develop predictive measures 
from those models to determine how many seats a political party may gain or 
lose in Congress based upon the strength of its presidential candidate.
Additional research has sought to analyze the surge and decline theory in 
concert with presidential coattails as a basis for understanding the dynamics of 
congressional midterm elections. There is extensive literature available on 
House elections and their relationship to presidential coattails, but the 
relationship between Senate elections and presidential coattails is limited. This 
study will focus on the relationship between Senate campaigns and the vote for 
president. More to the point, in contrast with prior research, this effort will 
analyze under what conditions Senate elections are able to effect the state level 
vote for president; a process akin to the notion of reverse coattails.
Reviewing the literature on presidential elections suggests that these 
studies were developed on the premise that national conditions such as the 
popularity of the president and the state of the national economy can have a 
direct affect on House elections. This review will look at the various presidential
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
models including Rosenstone (1983), Campbell (1986) and Holbrook’s (1991) 
work. Next, will be an examination of the research on presidential coattails. It is 
important to consider all the research on presidential coattails to ensure proper 
accounting for the variety of possible causal factors in the data. Additionally, this 
review is important to gain an understanding of what research has been 
completed to be able to contribute to the campaign literature.
From there, this chapter moves to a discussion of congressional election 
studies. Reviewing the research on House and Senate elections will provide the 
necessary background to answer the question -under what conditions do Senate 
elections affect presidential elections? Jacobsen (2000) suggests that the key to 
understanding coattails is to understand the interactions between individual 
candidates, such as candidate emergence, national conditions and campaign 
activity. This research builds on Jacobsen’s assumptions.
Finally, the underlying theme throughout this review and the thesis more 
generally is the “do campaigns matter” literature. This literature includes 
Campbell (2000), who suggests that national macro level indicators such as 
presidential popularity and the economy are more important than campaigns, to 
other researchers such as Holbrook who suggests that “it is clear that campaign 
effects play a key role in determining election outcomes” (1996, 148). This 
thesis attempts to evaluate election studies from the perspective that campaigns 
matter and have clear effects when elections are competitive. One additional 
area of discussion will consider the various conditions that create competitive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
campaigns and the interactive effects between elections occurring at the same 
time.
Presidential Studies
Rosenstone’s model (1983) was developed to forecast the presidential 
vote on a state-by-state basis. His model utilized a variety of factors effecting 
presidential elections. Some of the model’s factors included subjective measures 
such as social and racial issues. Holbrook’s (1991 ) research builds upon 
Rosenstone’s work and provides a model with more objective measures to 
evaluate a variety of conditions effecting presidential elections on a state-by-state 
basis. Specifically, Holbrook demonstrates that both state and national level 
factors accounted for variation in state level voting the 1976, 1980, and 1984 
presidential elections. The 1991 model is significant because it incorporated 
objective measures at the state-level for national influences as well as campaign 
variables. As outlined below, this thesis incorporates Holbrook’s work.
In contrast to Holbrook’s work, Campbell’s work questions the underlying 
assumptions that campaigns matter. Specifically, Campbell (1992) suggests that 
both Rosenstone’s and Holbrook’s models are incomplete. Utilizing a variety of 
factors in Rosenstone’s and Holbrook’s models, Campbell attempts to develop a 
predictive model to forecast the presidential vote in each state. The most 
significant difference in Campbell’s model is his use of trial heat polls instead of 
measures of campaign activity. Specifically, Campbell and Garand (2000) 
contend that it is possible to accurately predict presidential elections without
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
campaign variables. Campbell and Garand base their assumptions on campaign 
activities, which they term “predictable.” From the 2000 study, an example of a 
predictable campaign measure would be partisanship. These assumptions, 
however, work well only with non-competitive campaigns and with clearly defined 
macro variables such as the status of the economy. According to their research, 
campaigns do not have an effect on elections because the activity of each 
campaign counteracts the other and very few votes are in play, particularly in 
non-competitive campaigns. In addition, this research suggests that partisanship 
is a constant factor and therefore, makes voter choice predictable. Campbell and 
Garand do not consider the continual decline in partisanship, the impact of 
independent voters, or the increasing influence of swing voters, which affects 
state vote choice.^
In addition, Cambpell’s (1986) model underestimates economic factors 
and ideology, both of which effect swing voters. Each state has its own measure 
of political ideology, which is not necessarily reflected in partisanship registration 
(Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1986). It is important to evaluate each election on 
a state-by-state basis because the political climate in each state is distinctly 
different. If the political ideology of a presidential candidate is not matched with a 
state, it will prove more challenging, if not impossible, to win that state.
Holbrook’s (1991) model utilized specific independent variables to demonstrate 
the difference in the presidential vote on a state-by-state basis. Those factors 
not only include party strength and state ideology, but also include variables for
 ̂Bartels (2000) suggests there is not a decline in partisanship. This is discussed in more detail 
below.
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region, jobs, income, and whether or not it was the home state of the presidential 
or vice presidential party nominees. In addition, national macro level conditions 
such as the economy and presidential popularity were included. These variables 
combined with campaign intensity can shift the election dynamics in any state.
While some may argue presidential campaigns have a limited impact on 
state level voting, this opinion is not shared by all researchers. Shaw considered 
presidential campaign activity by analyzing state visits and television advertising 
for 1988, 1992, and 1996 (1999a). Shaw’s analysis considered media buys and 
presidential visits from Labor Day to Election Day. Shaw’s studies found 
“presidential campaigning influences statewide support for candidates” (1999a, 
358). Shaw also explained how some states never see a presidential candidate, 
while other states see them repeatedly, suggesting strategic allocations of 
campaign resources such as money and visits. That is, presidential candidates 
may visit battleground states more often compared to less competitive states. In 
addition to national and state forces, the work of Shaw suggests that presidential 
campaigning affects non-decided voters.
In summary, there are two schools of thought that exist regarding the role 
and importance of campaigns. The first suggests that macro level factors 
determine election campaigns. The second school of thought maintains macro 
level factors are important, but more significantly is the effect they have on 
candidate emergence. These macro level factors set up the backdrop for 
campaigns to matter.
10
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Surge and Decline 
As mentioned above, the primary approach to studying the effect that 
campaign activity at one level exerts on other campaigns has been top-down. 
Campbell (1987) evaluated the surge and decline theory in presidential elections, 
and offered an explanation as to why there are differences in voter turnout 
between presidential and midterm elections. Campbell explained a surge in 
turnout among partisans of the advantaged party and a surge in support for the 
advantaged party among independent voters. Angus Campbell’s (1960) work 
was used as the blueprint for Campbell’s later evaluation. Similar to the original 
theory. Campbell focuses on the short-term forces in presidential elections. The 
primary difference in the revised theory is the vote choice based on a “surge” of 
information in presidential elections resulting in a higher turnout of independent 
voters. This surge is suggested to have an impact on turnout rates and voter 
choice of partisans and independent voters alike. This surge of information can 
be related to campaign activity through the dramatic increase in information 
disseminated by political parties or the mobilization of partisan voters and 
undecided voters.
Kritzer and Eubank (1979) considered surge and decline as one possible 
explanation for the lack of presidential coattails. This explanation would be 
described in terms of the increase and changing characteristics of independent 
voters. Those characteristics include citizens with diminished party loyalty based 
on either economic or moral issues; both of which may contribute to an increase 
in independent voters. The changing characteristics of voters can be directly
11
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linked to a diminished association with political party affiliation as evidenced by 
split ticket voting, which gives rise to a greater number of independents.
Campbell asserts that voters have three possible choices in any election. 
First, an inveterate voter can make the choice to reinforce his or her vote for a 
favored party candidate. An inveterate voter is a citizen who regularly turns out 
for elections and supports his or her respective political party without fail. An 
inveterate voter would be defined as an individual with deep rooted and firmly 
established beliefs and connections to his or her political party. This typically 
manifests itself in terms of partisan or straight ticket voting. Second, voters of the 
disadvantaged party can choose to support a candidate whom they do not 
believe in or whom they do not believe can win or for voting for the favored 
candidate. Lastly, they could choose not to vote. According to Campbell, 
independent voters may be more easily swayed because they are not closely 
aligned with any one party.
Presidential Coattails
Although there are mixed reviews on the power of presidential coattails, 
the most accepted theory in political science is presidential coattails have been 
diminishing (Jacobsen, 2000; Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983; Ferejohn and Calvert,
1984; Mondak, 1990). For instance, the 1996 Democratic presidential victory of 
Bill Clinton should have benefited the Democrats in Congress, but it is the 
Republicans that gained two seats in the Senate.^ Similarly, in the 1998 midterm
 ̂The 1996 U.S. Senate election had 13 open seats; eight seats vacated by Democrats, with 
Republican victories in three of elections, plus the Republicans held on to their own, except one.
12
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election, Clinton gained seats in the House when it was predicted the Democrats 
would lose seats; a similar scenario unfolded in 2002. There have been several 
explanations for the reduction in presidential coattails including an increase in 
independent voters and a decrease in partisan identification. Both of these are 
discussed below.
The definition of presidential coattails utilized for this study, taken from 
Jacobsen (2001, 146), “reflects the notion that successful candidates at the top 
of the ticket -  on national elections, the winning presidential candidate -  pull 
some of their party’s candidates into office along with them riding, as they were, 
on their coattails.” In earlier studies, coattails were more pronounced if the 
presidential candidate had a high approval rating (Mondak, 1990) or won by a 
large margin (Kaplowtiz, 1971). There is a vast amount of political science 
research that discusses presidential coattails and whether or not coattails are 
alive and well (e.g.. Born, 1984; Campbell, 1986; Campbell and Sumners, 1990); 
if presidential coattails are declining (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983; Ferejohn and 
Calvert, 1984; Tuckel and Tejera, 1983); or if coattails are non-existent in a 
particular election (Mondak, 1990).
The coattail research above has mainly focused on the strength of 
presidential coattails and their impact on House elections as a one-way 
causation. There have been a variety of methods utilized to assess and predict 
presidential coattails. These approaches have included individual level data from 
national surveys (Jacobsen 1976; Calvert and Ferejohn 1983), aggregate data at 
the congressional level (Born, 1984) and at the national level (Ferejohn and
13
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Calvert 1984, Campbell 1986), and straight aggregate voting data (Kaplowtiz 
1971). However, the current research models do not have measures to account 
for the spillover effects from the various campaigns and consider how they 
influence vote choice.
Researchers have discussed the various influences coattails have on 
congressional elections. By evaluating coattails at the national level using a 
direct two-equation model, Calvert and Ferejohn (1983) suggest that presidential 
coattails have declined, but not at levels suggested by other research. Ferejohn 
and Calvert (1984) and Tuckel and Tejera (1983) offer a historical perspective of 
the presidential coattail effect and explain what they suggest is a downward trend 
or lessened impact of presidential coattails on House elections. The overall 
conclusion of these studies is the extent of coattail voting has declined steadily 
consistent with the decline in party identification over the past decades.
Contrary to the research that suggests a decline in party identification, 
Bartels (2000) disagrees with mainstream research that party identification has 
been declining. Bartels suggests that partisan voting has stabilized in the 1990s 
and continues to increase in importance. This research posits one possible 
hypothesis “that increasing partisanship in the electorate represents a response 
at the mass level to increasing partisanship at the elite level” (44). This 
contention would provide support for presidential coattail proponents.
Contrary to the mainstream opinions in political science today suggesting 
a downward trend in presidential coattails, Born (1984) and Campbell (1986) 
submit the presidential vote has lost little of its ability to expand House election
14
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margins. They argue that support for claims of a weakened impact on 
presidential coattails is based on inadequate evidence. Campbell and Born both 
evaluated the presidential vote and suggest that the presidential vote continues 
to have a strong and significant effect on congressional seat change. They 
further suggest that scholars have relied on faulty measurement strategies and 
should apply more appropriate measures to evaluate the research. One example 
is in regards to survey-based research. Born suggests that survey data are best 
served to identify individual motives, but “existing data are inadequate to 
disentangle the complex web of causality which can connect the two voting 
decisions” (61 ).
Presidential coattails have been analyzed strictly as a top-down 
phenomena with just a slight mention of a reverse coattail possibility in one 
Senate election study by Campbell and Sumners (1990). Campbell and Sumners 
attempted to illustrate how a political party’s presidential vote in the states 
remained positively related to its’ Senate vote. This work investigated to what 
extent presidential coattails are responsible for this association. Campbell and 
Sumners included all Senate elections in the study, even those that were not 
considered competitive. The analysis suggests that there are not any reverse 
coattails, but this finding does not systematically analyze this process, which is 
the intent of this effort.
15
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National Conditions and Campaign Effects
An implicit tension in the above literature is the debate regarding the role 
and importance of campaign processes for affecting election outcomes. There is 
disagreement among authors as to whether campaigns matter (e.g., Kahn and 
Kenney, 1999; Shaw, 1999b; Westlye, 1983; Holbrook, 1994) or whether they 
have less of an impact (Campbell, 2000; Campbell and Gerand, 2000). There is 
some debate as to how much campaigns matter and if national factors are the 
predicting measures. Specifically, some argue campaigns have small, direct 
effects and instead, are determined largely by national forces (Jacobsen, 2000).
In contrast, the work of Shaw (1999a) and Holbrook (1994) attempts to bridge the 
gap in our understanding of the interaction between national forces and 
campaign processes by arguing campaigns do matter. While this debate is far 
from settled, others argue that in addition to affecting presidential voting, national 
forces also indirectly influence what occurs in congressional elections 
(Abramowitz, 1988; Abramowitz and Segal, 1986).
Most notably, Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995) suggest that the 
public mood, an aggregated measure of the public’s domestic policy preferences 
create the context in which elections occur. Along these same lines, national 
conditions such as presidential popularity and the economy create the 
environment for campaigns to matter. According to Jacobsen and Kernell (1981), 
these national level forces have an indirect effect on candidate recruitment. That 
is, the economy and the presidential popularity thermometer ratings set up the 
conditions for quality candidates to emerge. If the national economy was
16
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determined to be in a recession, quality ctiallengers from the presidential 
challenger party would be expected to emerge. Similarly, if the economy had 
strong positive indicators, quality challengers from the presidential incumbent 
party would be expected to emerge.
In order to analyze the impact of presidential campaign effects on the 
state level vote, Shaw (1999a) utilized data on television purchases and 
presidential candidate appearances. Shaw’s study concluded that candidate 
activities, in each respective state, were directly and positively related to each 
candidate’s vote. Furthermore, while national factors such as the economy play 
a role in congressional and presidential election outcomes, campaign activities 
are important and make a difference. Other research by Kahn and Kenney,
1999; Westlye, 1991; Shaw, 1999b; Holbrook 1991, 1994; and Abramowtiz,
1984, all concluded campaigns do make a difference.
There is some discrepancy between the various authors as to what 
should be considered a campaign event and what comprises national factors. 
Holbrook (1994) puts forth a model for candidate support that incorporates 
campaign variables and national conditions. Holbrook’s (1994) study focused on 
specific campaign and national factors. He reviewed a variety of national events 
that had a significant impact on public opinion including campaign momentum, 
debates, and political conventions. National conventions were identified by 
researchers as the most influential campaign event for both Democratic and 
Republican candidates (Holbrook, 1994; Shaw 1999b), while the Democratic and
17
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Republican national committees consider this as simply the kick-off for the 
presidential campaign.
Senate Studies
In 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provided for the direct election of senators."^ Since this time, Senate elections 
have evolved into highly competitive and complex campaigns. Senate races are 
typically viewed as more competitive than House races because they are not 
affected by redistricting and because of the longer election terms. Senate terms 
are six years and staggered with one-third of the Senate seats contested every 
two years. Even though it is the Senate that is perceived as the powerhouse of 
Congress, more attention and research has focused on House elections. This is 
mainly attributed to the sheer number of House elections every two years, which 
provides more data to develop and test explanatory and predictive models.
At the same time. Senate campaigns have greater visibility than House 
campaigns (Stewart, 1989) and, as suggested before, are generally more 
competitive since they attract more well-financed and experienced challengers. 
There have been several studies that analyzed various characteristics of Senate 
elections, including challenger quality and competitiveness. Stewart (1989) 
focused on predicting quality challengers by considering marginality and 
campaign expenditures. Westlye (1983) analyzed the competitive nature of
Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, United States Senators were appointed by their 
respective state legislature.
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senatorial seats in respect to resources and explored constituency-based
explanations.
Abramowitz and Segal (1992) focused on Senate elections and attempted 
to demonstrate seat changes through patterns associated with national 
conditions. Their work suggests that the prior distribution of Senate seats along 
with the economic conditions and the popularity of the incumbent president have 
distinct effects on the vote. Abramowitz (1988) builds upon this research and 
uses the individual Senate contest as the unit of analysis to estimate the relative 
influence of variables effecting Senate elections including political characteristics 
of states, characteristics of candidates, and national political conditions. 
Abramowitz attempts to build a comprehensive model of Senate election 
outcomes, and includes variables that continue to be at the center of the electoral 
literature such as candidate spending, coattails, challenger quality, and 
partisanship. This work suggests that Senate elections are influenced by 
campaigns and national conditions.
Additional studies have attempted to explain how candidate characteristics 
or policy decisions affect the vote for Senate. The work of Wright and Berkman 
(1986) focused on whether decisions by incumbent Senators affected election 
outcomes by evaluating the “policy dimension” in Senate seats. Ragsdale and 
Rusk (1995) and Kahn and Kenney (1997) evaluate conditions or criteria that 
influence the decision making process of citizens in Senate elections. The 
research suggests that as a campaign becomes more competitive, the more
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likely citizens are to consider ideology or economic conditions. In addition, 
presidential approval and issue formation also may be considered.
Underlying the influence of these factors is the competitiveness of an 
election. Competitive races generate more money, which then creates an 
environment to attract media attention and increase voter interest. Like 
dominoes, competitive races then lead to more public attention and more debate 
on policy issues (Kahn and Kenney, 1999). These competitive elections may 
cause a “spillover” effect that may factor into other races occurring at the same 
point in time. This point is explored in chapter three. The role of competitiveness 
in shaping a Senate race manifests itself in a number of other variables including 
challenger quality, incumbency, marginality, campaign finance, and partisanship.
Quality Challengers
Quality challengers are defined in terms of characteristics or previous 
political experience (Abramowitz 1988, Jacobsen 1989, Shaw 1999a, Stewart, 
1989; Westlye, 1991). Evidence suggests that candidate characteristics such as 
challenger quality have the strongest influence on the outcomes of the recent 
Senate elections (Abramowitz, 1986). A quality challenger is one who is well 
known or established in his or her respective state. This can be accomplished 
through holding a significant political office or having celebrity status as 
mentioned before through Canon (1990). There is an expectation in Senate 
elections that the challenger will more likely have held a political office and be 
better financed than candidates in other elections.
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Squire and Smith (1996) posit the higher state office one holds, the more 
significant a challenger they will be in congressional elections. They developed a 
theory ranking each state political office. The higher the state office, the more 
points received and thus this officeholder would be expected to be a more 
qualified candidate. The assumption is the more visible a political office held is, 
the more likely that individual would have the experience and name recognition 
to be a quality candidate for Congress. That is, quality challengers are strategic 
and will evaluate and analyze which race would be more likely to be competitive, 
and basically, winnable.
Incumbency
The incumbency effect has been identified as a key factor in 
congressional elections (Abramowitz 1986, 1988; Kritzer and Eubank, 1979; 
Campbell and Sumners, 1990; Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983). Calvert and 
Ferejohn (1983) suggest that while partisan factors continue to decrease, 
incumbency factors continue to increase. Incumbents have the advantage in 
most political races because of name recognition and previous campaign 
experience. Incumbents traditionally have had the ability to generate resources 
early and generally have media access through community events and with 
those duties associated with the position (Mayhew, 1974).
Contrary to the opinions of researchers who consider incumbency a strong 
factor, Eubank (1985) and Tuckel and Tejera (1983) suggest that a more general 
and historical trend in the decline in partisanship connecting one election to
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another has weakened the importance of incumbency. Tuckel and Tejera 
suggest a decline in the effects of incumbency in Senate elections and believe 
incumbency is tied to local forces unique to congressional races such as 
partisanship and attitudes. Their research concludes incumbents have an 
indirect effect because of the valuable resources they bring to the table. Tuckel 
and Tejera further suggest that the lessened effect of incumbency is an indication 
of weakened past constraints of party loyalty and weakened presidential 
coattails. They conclude that incumbency can no longer be used as predictive 
measure.
Marginality
Prior research has conceptualized the safeness of an incumbent’s seat in 
terms of marginality. Stewart suggests that quality challengers are determined 
by marginality (1989). Marginality, as used in this thesis, is defined as the past 
margin of victory for the incumbent. The prior margin of victory is a strong 
predictor of whether or not the incumbent will face a quality challenger in the next 
election (Stewart, 1989; Abramowitz, 1988; Bond, Covington and Fleisher, 1985). 
The incumbent would be considered vulnerable and have a weakened 
incumbency effect if the prior election were close. Jacobsen noted “measures of 
marginality are, in essence, estimates of vulnerability” (2000, 28). That is, 
experienced challengers are more likely to make strategic decisions to run 
against an incumbent based on the results of the previous election.
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Campaign Finance
Election studies have utilized a variety of campaign expenditures to 
consider competitiveness. Congressional election outcomes are considered to 
hinge on the challenger’s ability to spend money. Indeed, the single most 
important variable in determining whether or not an incumbent can be unseated 
is campaign expenditures by the opposition (Abramowitz, 1988; Shaw, 1999a; 
Squire and Smith, 1996).
To this end, Abramowitz (1988) suggests that incumbent spending has 
less of an impact on Senate elections than challenger spending. Instead, it is 
the amount of money raised by the challenger that shapes the competitiveness of 
a race. For incumbents, spending has a diminishing return. In untangling this, 
Jacobsen (1980) suggests that there is a point at which incumbent expenditures 
begin to hurt the incumbent candidate because incumbents increase spending in 
response to the spending of challengers. “As an incumbent candidate spends 
more money and becomes better known, the impact of further spending 
diminishes” (Abramowitz, 1988, 38). In addition, Jacobsen suggests that 
"... incumbents usually exploit their official resources for reaching constituents so 
thoroughly that the additional increment of information about their virtues put 
forth during the campaign adds comparatively little to what is already known and 
felt about them” (2000, 45). Westlye (1983) utilized the two-to-one expenditure 
ratio breakpoint to assess if resources were somewhat equal and the campaign 
considered competitive. Westlye admits the breakpoint is arbitrary, however, it
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serves as a good indicator of whether the challenger could mount a viable 
financial challenge.
Tuckel and Tejera (1983) again contradict dominant research that 
suggests incumbent and challenger spending have comparable effects on 
average. They suggest that the effects of spending are different based on the 
size of each state. Incumbents are favored by campaign spending dynamics in 
large states and challengers are favored in small states. This is linked to the 
ability to personalize a message and to reach the voting public. Tuckel and 
Tejera discuss the ability of a candidate to reach more voters in a smaller state 
with less money. However, they did not analyze the differences in population 
between some of the larger and smaller states.
Media
Media intensity has been identified as an important measure to determine 
the competitiveness of Senate campaigns (Kahn and Kenney 1997). Senate 
races typically generate more intense media coverage than other local elections 
or House elections (Abramowitz, 1988) because they are more competitive than 
House elections (Abramowitz, 1988; Canon, 1990) and less frequent. Senate 
elections are statewide and are considered to have bigger issues at stake. 
Tuckel and Tejera (1983) have studied a decline in the traditional factors of 
predicting Senate elections and believe that the mass media are becoming the 
biggest predictor of campaigns. At the same time, these studies fail to recognize 
that media attention is a function of competitive campaigns and quality
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challengers. The more an election is perceived as newsworthy, the more media 
coverage it will receive. The media want to focus on elections that are 
competitive with a questionable ending that generates curiosity (Campbell, 
2000). There must be a competitive election before the media will get involved. 
Thus, media exposure is a function or byproduct of a competitive campaign and 
accounted for in campaign intensity.
Party Strength and Partisanship
Although the Constitution does not specifically mention political parties, 
partisanship has operated as a stabilizing influence for our system (Wattenberg, 
1990). The strength of political parties has worked to predict election outcomes, 
provide resources for candidates, and secure a base of support for party 
candidates (Pomper, 1977). Political parties also have historically had the 
responsibility of generating loyalty and political interest. They have served to 
mobilize voters and act as socialization agents fostering stability within our 
political framework. Political parties provide members a venue by which they 
become politically active and work for policy changes. There are a considerable 
number of elections in any given year including ballot questions, initiatives, and 
races for local, state, and national office.
Kahn and Kenney (1997) suggest that one of the most recognized and 
reliable predictors of candidate evaluations is party identification. They also 
suggest (1999) that as campaigns become more competitive, citizens are more 
likely to consider policy ideology, partisanship, and campaign influences. Party
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identification would refer to those citizens registered to vote who identify with a 
major political party. Kamieniecki (1988) suggests that the more a person 
identifies with a particular party, the more they were likely to apply partisan 
behavior. Westlye (1991) suggests that citizen partisanship and ideology must 
be taken into consideration when there is a strong quality challenger with a 
competitive campaign. Political ideology and party strength are important factors 
to get out the base vote for candidates, but the key voters in competitive 
elections are swing voters. If partisanship identification were the key factor in 
election outcomes, then registration alone would be a predictor of winners and 
losers.
Conclusion
As the above review suggests, the study of campaigns and elections is 
well developed. At the same time, this research has not considered the upward 
affect Senate elections have on the state level presidential vote. As such, this 
effort differs from much of the prior literature in this area by focusing on the 
reverse coattails process. As such, this thesis embraces the premise all politics 
is local and local politics can affect national elections including the vote for 
president.
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY
This thesis will assess the effects competitive Senate elections have on 
the state level vote for president. Specifically, this thesis argues competitive 
Senate elections have a positive influence on the presidential vote. The complex 
nature of this research requires modeling both Senate and presidential elections 
on a state-by-state basis. This establishes control for the influence that 
presidential campaigns have on Senate elections while at the same time 
assessing the affect that Senate campaigns have on each state's presidential 
vote.
In order to account for all causal relationships, this study will identify the 
election variables that occur simultaneously at both the state and national level. 
National and local campaigns must contend with not only the forces generated by 
their own campaign activities, but also those macro level forces that set up the 
context in which these campaigns operate. These macro-level variables include 
the state of the economy and presidential thermometer ratings.
The argument presented in this chapter draws on the above research 
evaluating presidential elections. More specifically, utilizing a multi-level 
framework, the thesis assesses how the confluence of macro-level factors affect
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Senate campaigns. It is the macro level factors that are expected to have the 
strongest impact on the emergence of quality challengers. These factors set up 
the backdrop necessary for competitive Senate elections to have an impact on 
the vote for president. The specific hypothesis for this study is “Senate campaign 
activity will have a positive affect on the state wide presidential vote” and 
“competitive Senate elections will have a positive affect on the state wide 
presidential vote.”
Senate Model
There is increasing evidence that campaign effects are best understood 
by evaluating those elections that are competitive. By generalizing the effects of 
campaigns across any election cycle, the true impact of campaigns may be 
skewed because many races are not competitive. In order to accurately address 
a reverse coattail relationship between the vote for Senate and the vote for 
President, the Senate race must be competitive. With competitive Senate 
elections, the local electorate becomes stronger as an overall force and thus 
affects the vote for president to a measurable degree. This thesis expects to 
see a reverse coattail effect present in competitive Senate elections. This would 
be attributable to a decline in partisanship identification and more candidate 
centered elections, both of which increase the importance of campaigns in 
explaining election outcomes.
As suggested before, identifying competitive Senate elections is important 
to address the argument presented in this theory. In order to have a competitive
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election, there must be a quality challenger with a well-financed campaign. This 
research includes measures to identify those factors that determine a quality 
challenger. Challengers who have previous political experienœ generally have 
name recognition and the status likely to generate campaign resources enabling 
them to mount a viable challenge (Jacobsen, 2000). This study measures 
campaign finances through campaign expenditures. If there is a well-established 
challenger who can raise the resources to mount a competitive campaign, that 
race will gain exposure and media attention creating a high level of campaign 
intensity.
Campaign intensity allows this study to measure the direct effects of 
Senate campaigns and competitiveness on presidential state-level voting. To 
this end, Campbell (2000) suggests that campaigns may have an influence of 
only 4% to 6% on the vote (188). The 2000 presidential election results explain 
how 4% could have made a tremendous difference, especially in Florida.^ This 
reinforces the premise that campaigns matter when they are competitive. It is in 
competitive Senate elections where the “spillover effect” will have a greater 
influence on the state level vote for president. Spillover effects would be defined 
as those events or actions by another campaign or event that have an impact, 
indirectly or directly, on other campaigns For this thesis, competitive Senate 
elections will be defined as those elections that have a quality challenger with 
previous political experience who is well-financed.
® Bush and Gore’s presidential votes in Florida are significantiy under Campbell’s 4% margin, with 
each candidate receiving 48.4% of the vote initially.
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Emergence of Quality Candidates
Incumbency, marginality, and open seats are important variables that 
interact with the macro level factors to determine if quality candidates emerge, 
and, thus create the potential for competitive elections. Without competitive 
Senate campaigns, there is not expected to be a reverse coattail relationship; a 
point made in the introductory chapter's overview of the 2004 race between 
Harry Reid and Richard Ziser in Nevada. Incumbency itself is a key 
consideration. Incumbency is often cited as the major factor in Senate elections. 
Abramowitz (1986, 1988), Campbell and Sumners (1990), and Calvert and 
Ferejohn (1983) call incumbency the single most important factor in determining 
election outcomes. Generally speaking, the more name recognition one 
candidate has through incumbency, the more resources a candidate will 
generate in terms of money and support. Incumbents have a team of employees 
already working when the election cycle begins (Mayhew, 1974). Although 
incumbency is important, these same studies demonstrate the incumbency effect 
is diminished when there is a quality challenger; likewise other factors such as 
marginality and an open seat must be taken into consideration.
Marginality has often been cited as a determining factor as to whether or 
not an incumbent faces a quality challenger. The emergence of a quality 
challenger is crucial for an election to be competitive. If the last election proved 
to be close, then the incumbent is seen as vulnerable and can expect a well- 
financed and quality challenger from the opposing party in the next election. In 
general. Senate races are more competitive than House seats because Senate
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seats are seen as more valuable (Jacobsen, 1986). With a small level of 
marginality, these factors set up the scenario for quality challengers to be enticed 
in the election to run against an established incumbent.
Unlike marginality, which may generate competitive elections when the 
previous election was seen as close, open seats produce the most competitive 
elections because they generate a higher level of voter turn out and attract 
quality candidates from both parties (Jacobsen, 2000). The candidates do not 
have to consider incumbency or marginality, because most likely both will have 
previous political experience and be more or less on an equal footing. The 
candidate in the open-seat who generates the most resources and exposure 
should benefit the presidential candidate of the same party. In terms of coattail 
effects, the results of an open Senate election will generally be a “wash”, as the 
campaigns run by both candidates will likely counter balance one another. It is in 
these “open seat” elections that the local political dynamics and structure may 
prove to be most influential. This type of election would illustrate the point of how 
campaign effects might cancel each other out as suggested by Campbell (2000) 
depending on the macro level variables.
Presidential Model
As mentioned in chapter two, other research has focused on presidential 
coattails as a one-way causation, from the president downward. This study will 
differ from previous work by suggesting a reverse coattail relationship from the 
bottom-up. The key to understanding this relationship is recognizing the multiple
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dynamics of the election process and the symbiotic relationship between state 
and national elections. More specifically, by identifying competitive Senate 
elections one can analyze the influence that “local politics ' have on the vote for 
President, while accounting for the effect of presidential campaigns on the 
contemporaneous Senate races.
As outlined above, Holbrook’s original model included measures for state 
unemployment, change in state income, party strength, state ideology, state 
ideology interaction, a dummy for the South, presidential and vice presidential 
home state, presidential popularity, presidential home region, as well as 
economic measures such as percent change in national income and national 
unemployment rate. The percent change in national income is similar to the 
measure used by Abramowitz and Segal (1986), Holbrook's model will be 
modified to incorporate Senate campaign intensity as well as other modifications, 
including presidential campaign activity.
Presidential campaign activity will be included in the presidential model 
utilizing Shaw's work (1999a). Shaw measured campaign intensity by counting 
the number of times a presidential candidate visited each state as well as 
additional work that focused on media buys. There is little doubt national 
campaigns influence local elections. A visit by a presidential candidate to any 
state is suggested to provide a boost to the campaigns of the local political 
hopefuls of the same party (Shaw, 1999a). That is, while this visit is intended to 
strengthen the presidential candidate’s base vote, it can have spillover effects on 
other elections. Shaw argues in some cases presidential candidates will visit
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States they are expected to lose to help turn down ticket races (1999b). 
Presidential campaign activity for this thesis will be measured based on the 
number of times a presidential candidate campaigned in each state during the 
1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 election years from Labor Day until Election Day. 
The information on presidential visits is not avaialbe for campaigns prior to 1988.
Holbrook’s model included a variable for home state influence for 
presidential and vice presidential candidates. Campbell (2000) and Holbrook 
(1991) suggest that the presidential or vice presidential candidate will gain 
several percentage points for the home state advantage. This variable would be 
expected to capture any additional influences of campaign intensity along with 
presidential campaign visits. Additionally, this model was unable to include 
Shaw’s media buys for presidential campaign activity because the information 
was available only for 1988, 1992, and 1996. This would not provide enough 
cases to show a systematic effect.
Macro-Level Variables
Holbrook provided a national measure of presidential popularity and a 
measure for the state of the economy. Both the presidential vote as well as the 
Senate vote is affected by macro level factors. The economic variable is a 
macro level variable that influences voting choices as well as providing the 
backdrop for quality challengers to emerge. According to Wattenberg (1991 ), 
economic measures have been steadily increasing their importance with the 
voting electorate while factors such as partisanship have been decreasing.
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Senate and House incumbents are often held responsible, along with the
president, for the state of the economy (Campbell 1987). This thesis includes
similar macro level variables such as the national unemployment rate and the
percent change in national income, as used by Holbrook. These variables will
help measure the impact of the economy on the vote. The state of the economy
can also affect the emergence of quality challengers. If it is a bad year for the
President’s party because of a slow economy, one is less likely to see quality
challengers emerge from that party.®
A booming economy and a popular president (or presidential candidate) 
are assumed to favor the party in power; economic problems and other 
national failings are blamed on the administration are costly to its 
congressional candidates. Exactly those things that politicians and 
political scientists who look at aggregate data believe influence 
congressional voters also guide the strategic decision of potential 
candidates and contributors. (Campbell, 2000,154)
Quality challengers would more likely emerge from the opposition party in 
this scenario. The effect of these macro-level variables on the presidential vote 
is straightforward. If the public mood from war or recession is working against 
the president or his party, this will hurt the president and his party and candidate 
emergence. Alternatively, if the economy is strong, this would be expected to 
boost the votes for the president and his party.
Shaw’s data (1999b) discusses how scandals or blunders can affect the vote. This theory will 
not include any variables that measure scandals or media blunders. In addition, this model does 
not include any outside influences such as war.
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Partisanship and Ideology
As detailed above, campaigns are complex with a multitude of short-and 
long-term election forces occurring simultaneously. As a consequence, 
explaining election outcomes and vote choice cannot be reduced to analyzing 
partisan registration. While it is important to consider partisan registration, the 
more important consideration would be to identify inveterate voters and swing 
voters. The swing vote in states creates the environment where campaigns 
become important. In addition, the number of independent voters on state 
registration documents also provides a target for campaigns to make a 
difference.
State-level partisanship historically has been a key indicator of how a state 
may vote in an upcoming presidential election. Identifying with a political party 
led many to simply disregard other candidates. In more recent years, there has 
been an increase in the number of voters who identify themselves as 
independent and an increase in the number of swing voters. Through the years, 
most research, except for Bartels, demonstrates a decline in party identification 
to a voter mainstream that considers itself more moderate. Although partisan 
identification has weakened slightly over the past decade, it is still an important 
factor to consider when evaluating election outcomes. With the increase of 
independent and swing voters, the stability of the state political party structure 
weakens, as does straight ticket voting. This begins to strengthen the impact of 
local voting and, more importantly, campaigns.
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Party identification is not as clear-cut as it once was. The voting dynamics 
have shifted from being party-based to being candidate-centered. This 
candidate-centered focus has encouraged more individuality, with an increase in 
the number of individuals classifying themselves as independents or becoming 
“swing voters.” Swing voters are defined as those citizens registered as either a 
Democrat or a Republican who do not vote strictly along party lines or citizens 
registered as Independents. The decline in partisanship and the increasing 
number of independent voters have diminished the presidential coattail effect and 
enhanced the impact of local competitive elections (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983). 
Campaigns have increased their importance in an attempt to reach these 
independent and swing voters. It is important to keep in mind campaigns are 
designed to secure the party base and persuade those swing and independent 
voters of a candidate’s worthiness (Damore, 2004).
Conditions for Reverse Coattail Effect 
The macro-level variables including presidential popularity, state ideology, 
and the economy set-up the conditions for reverse coattails to be present. The 
president should benefit from some reverse coattails when the macro-level 
variables benefit the Senate challenger from the president’s party. This scenario 
would produce a quality candidate able to mount a strong challenge against the 
incumbent. The campaign intensity would generate a high level of interest from 
party members, thus the reverse coattails. Consequently, when the same 
macro-levels do not favor the president’s party and the Senate challenger is from
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the president’s party, reverse coattails would not be expected. This would 
primarily be because the Senate race would not be considered competitive by 
the variables previously discussed in this study. Unless there is a quality 
challenger and, thus, a competitive election, there is not expected to be reverse 
coattails.
Additionally, one would not expect to see a reverse coattail effect if the 
macro-level variables favor the president’s party, and the Senate challenger is 
from the challenger party competing against an incumbent from the president’s 
party. This situation would be unlikely to produce a quality challenger. Also, 
there is the chance the Senate campaign may actually help the challenger’s party 
presidential candidate. This could occur if the macro-level variables do not favor 
the President’s party, and the Senate challenger is from the opposition party 
competing against an incumbent from the President’s party. These macro-level 
variables coupled with campaign intensity provide the basis for this theory.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
Presidential coattail theories and Senate campaign models have 
traditionally utilized standard multiple regression models focusing on the 
campaign process operations in isolation. These studies fail to capture the 
causal relationships between independent variables occurring simultaneously at 
different levels. If a causal relationship exists among campaign variables at 
different levels, an ordinary least squares regression model (OLS) examining 
only one level will not capture those effects.
In order to overcome these shortcomings, this thesis presents three 
regression models. The first is labeled the “naive model” because it looks at 
Senate and presidential races in isolation. Specifically, it estimates separate 
models for the presidential and Senate election that do not consider the spillover 
effects. The second model extends the first by examining the spillover effects 
between Senate and presidential elections. Again, it estimates separate models 
for the presidential and Senate election, but includes variables tapping the 
campaign activity of the other race. The last model presents a causal analysis of 
the entire process that captures both the direct and indirect relationships among 
the variables and as such, provides a more complete analysis of the causal 
process of interest.
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For all models, the Senate contest is the unit of analysis. The data were 
originally designed to capture the two-party vote. This proved to be problematic 
since it did not capture the incumbency effects or the economic effects present in 
either the presidential or Senate races. Additionally, the two-party system 
measurements of Republican and Democrat did not permit the standard OLS or 
causal model to effectively measure some of the variables created in this study. 
Based on these concerns, both analyses are conceptualized in terms of the 
White House incumbent party. That is, the party of the current president during 
the election year would be considered the incumbent party. For example, in the 
2000 election, President Bill Clinton was the Democrat President in the White 
House. However, due to term limits, he was unable to run again. Since he was 
the sitting president at the time of the 2000 election, the incumbent party for 2000 
was coded as Democrat.
One obstacle to evaluating Senate elections is the Federal Election 
Commission (EEC) reports were not required until 1974. This does not permit 
campaign financial data to be included in election studies prior to 1974. This 
study is unable to consider Senate elections prior to 1976 because this research 
utilizes EEC campaign expenditure data to help isolate competitive Senate 
elections. Based on the financial data, this thesis initially compiled data for 230 
Senate campaigns from 1976-2000. Table 4-1 provides a detailed listing of each 
variable and description.
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Table 4.1 Variables and Definitions
VARIABLE DEFINITION
Percent Change 
National Product
The percent change in net national product (Macro 
variable)
Unemployment National level unemployment rate (Macro variable)
Partisanship Percent of IP'' in the State Legislature
Quality
Challenger
IP candidate with previous political experience 1 ; CP 
candidate with previous political experience -1 ; and 
neither or both having previous political experience 0.
Seat Type 
(Casual M ode lf
Trichotomous measure for Senate seat type: 1 for IP 
Seat Advantage; -1 for CP Seat Advantage; 0 for open
seat®.
Marginality Trichotomous Measure: IP race within 10% coded as -1; 
CP race within 10% as 1 ; Coded as 0 if over 10%.
Senate Campaign 
Intensity (IP)
IP cost per voter for money spent through 12/31 of 
campaign year
Senate Campaign 
Intensity (CP)
CP Cost Per voter for money spent through 12/31 of 
campaign year
Senate State 
Level Vote
Senate State level vote for the presidential IP
(IP) Presidential 
Campaign Activity
Number of IP presidential candidate visits to each state 
from Labor Day to Election Da/®
(CP) Presidential 
Campaign Activity
Number of CP Presidential candidate visits to each state 
from Labor Day to Election Day
Presidential 
Campaign Activity 
(Casual Model)
For the causal model, the Presidential campaign variable 
was changed to reflect Shaw’s original data and used the 
difference between the IP Visits and CP Visits
Presidential State 
Level Vote
The Incumbent’s Party share of the State Level two party 
presidential vote.
Home State 
Advantage
Home state (registered to vote) of Presidential or Vice 
Presidential candidate. Coded as 1 for IP, -1 for CP -  all 
other states coded as 0
Presidential
Thermometer
NES data on national presidential thermometer ratings.
Incumbency Incumbent Party Incumbent Advantage coded as 1, 
Challenger Party Incumbent Advantage coded as -1, and 
no incumbent is 0.
IP is incumbent Party; CP is Challenger Party: Incumbent Party is determined by the current 
Administration in the White House during election year.
® Where Noted “Causal Model” the variable was operationalized different for the OLS and Causal 
Model.
® Seat type does not capture open seat advantage, but Instead attempts to capture the advantage 
of the Incumbent or Challenger Party on Competitive Senate Races.
10 Shaw’s (1999a) Data
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Another area where data collection was problematic was identifying a 
state level variable to capture presidential campaign activity. The state level 
presidential variables that were available both came from Shaw. Shaw's TV Ad 
buy data were compiled 1988, 1992 and 1996. However, the information was not 
available to create a comparable measure for 2000. Shaw’s presidential visit 
data also analyzed 1988, 1992 and 1996. The information on presidential state 
visits was readily available to create a comparable measure for 2000. Based on 
the need to include a presidential campaign variable, this precluded any inclusion 
of Senate elections prior to 1988. Kahn and Kenney’s (1997) media measure 
was considered, but this data was not easily duplicated and there was the issue 
of continuity among years. While other state level presidential campaign finance 
variables were researched, state level financial data was not required or 
recorded by the Federal Election Commission.^^ As a consequence of these 
data limitations, the campaign cycles that are used here are 1988, 1992, 1996 
and 2000, resulting in 133 cases. With the deletion of Louisiana from the study 
because of the state’s requirements for candidates to receive over 50% of the 
vote, the resulting number of observations is 127.
The information filed in FEC reports and recorded through government 
resources is deemed accurate and reliable as part of the warehousing of political 
information. The information obtained through state and federal sources are also 
considered accurate, as a standard in political science research. The above
Ad buy data for 2000 is now available through Goldstein (2004). This could possibly more 
effectively capture state level presidential campaign activity, for future research.
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information is considered reliable. All information was transferred to obtain 
accuracy so ttiere would not be any validity issues.
Presidential Model
As discussed before, this study modified Holbrook’s (1991) model of state 
level presidential voting. Holbrook’s model utilized a pooled, cross-sectional 
approach to demonstrate both state and national forces that influence a 
presidential election. This thesis operated under the same premise presented by 
Holbrook that there are state and national level forces that affect presidential 
elections.
This research utilized the President Incumbent Party’s State Level Vote as 
the dependent variable. This is measured in terms of the White House 
incumbent’s party share of the state level two-party vote. Initially, this variable 
was coded as the Democrat’s share of the two-party vote, but the measure had 
to be modified to account for incumbency effects and the influence of macro 
conditions.
This thesis used the following independent variables in the presidential 
regression models; Home State, Partisanship, Presidential Thermometer 
Ratings, Unemployment, and the Percent Change In National Product In 
addition to the state and national level factors, the presidential model includes a 
measure of Presidential Campaign Activity to account for presidential campaign 
effects on a state-by-state basis. For the presidential spillover, a variable of 
Senate Campaign Intensity was used to capture the Senate campaign effects.
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This was operationalized as the cost per voter for the presidential incumbent 
party Senate challenger and the presidential incumbent party Senate incumbent.
As utilized in Shaw’s (1999a) research, Presidential Campaign Activity is 
measured based on the number of times a presidential candidate traveled to 
each state from Labor Day to Election Day. Presidential campaign appearances 
allow presidential candidates to gain greater exposure in each state and 
generate their own campaign forces (Shaw, 1999a). Shaw’s data are utilized for 
the 1988, 1992, and 1996 elections. A comparable measure has been created 
for 2000 by reviewing available data on Bush and Gore presidential state visits 
from Labor Day to Election Day.^^ The same time frame was utilized to maintain 
consistency. As discussed above, data were not available for previous election 
years limiting this thesis’ ability to increase the number of observations.
State level presidential popularity and thermometer ratings are considered 
macro level variables that create the backdrop for both Senate and presidential 
campaigns. Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman (2002) created job approval ratings for 
presidents. Senators, and governors from state level public opinion polls. 
However, this data did not include all states for each year. The information is not 
available to evaluate state level presidential thermometer or popularity ratings on 
a state-by-state basis. Based on this data limitation, this thesis had to utilize the 
national presidential thermometer ratings. The national popularity ratings in 
Holbrook’s model initially utilized the Gallup-poll, while this research used the 
presidential thermometer data from the National Election Studies guide.
Calendars w ere obtained on www.Doliticsandelections.com.
NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior http://www.umich.edu/ nes/nesguide
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The status of the economy is considered an important factor in 
campaigns. The National Unemployment data, as well as The Percent Change in 
Net National Product both serve as the economic variables. These macro level 
measures provide the backdrop for campaigns to matter and to determine if a 
quality challenger may emerge. The Percent Change in Net National Product has 
been gathered through labor statistics.^'* The percent change in net national 
product is detailed and compiled for this study. The national level Unemployment 
figures were gathered from the labor statistics website.*® The economic 
variables are expected to perform as strong macro level variables influencing the 
Senate and presidential elections.
As discussed earlier, partisanship is an important consideration in state 
and national elections. It was not possible to utilize partisan registration on a 
state-by-state basis for a variety of reasons. First, the partisan numbers are 
inconsistent. That is, state numbers and federal election numbers are not always 
identical. In addition, some states update their numbers, which causes some 
confusion with the data. Also, not all states register voters based on party and 
some states allow voter registration on Election Day. Considering the above, a 
new partisanship variable was created. The Partisanship variable was created 
by determining the percent of legislative members from the incumbent party in 
each state legislature. By obtaining the number of Republican and Democrat 
members of each state’s legislature, this thesis was able to create a partisanship
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economics Analysis, Marcti 2004. 
(www.bea.doc.gov)
 ̂U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 2004. (www.bls.gov)
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variable. The partisanship variable is expected to impact both the presidential 
state level and Senate state level vote in a positive manner.
Holbrook’s (1991) research suggested that presidential and vice 
presidential candidates receive a boost in terms of a percent of the vote from 
their home state. This is termed Home State Advantage. This thesis was able to 
research the home states (defined as those states that presidential and vice 
presidential candidates were registered to vote in) for both the incumbent and 
challenger presidential party candidates. The variable is coded as 1 for 
incumbent party home state and -1 for the challenger party home state. All other 
states were coded as 0.
In order to evaluate spillover effects, an additional variable is added to the 
presidential model. To examine the influence that intensity of the Senate race 
has on the outcome of the presidential election within a state, this thesis includes 
a variable to account for the amount of money spent by the candidates in the 
Senate election. This is constructed as a cost per voter variable and is explained 
in more detail below.
Senate Model
As with the presidential model, a naive Senate model was developed to 
provide a baseline for comparison. This research utilized the incumbent party’s 
Senate State Level Vote as the dependent variable. This is measured in terms of
This variable is not perfect because of gerrymandering that typically provides the majority party 
with a small seat advantage. Additional variables were considered such as the vote in the last 
gubernatorial race. However, because of incumbency effects, this measure is problematic. 
Further research would require the development of a more precise measurement of partisanship.
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the White House incumbent’s party share of the state level two-party vote. The 
Senate model includes the following independent variables: Incumbency, 
Challenger Quality, Senate Campaign Intensity, Marginality, and Partisanship.
As indicated earlier, having a quality challenger has been determined to 
be one of the most important factors in Senate election outcomes. As discussed 
in chapter two, to be considered competitive, a quality challenger must have 
previous political experience. This thesis coded the variable of Quality 
Challenger as the incumbent party Senate candidate with previous political 
experience with 1, while the Senate candidate from the challenger party with 
previous political experience was coded -1. Any Senate candidate that had 
neither candidate holding previous political experience or both holding political 
experience were coded as 0. The information about Senate candidates was 
gathered through Congressional Quarterly Reports and the American Political 
Almanac. Because the American Political Almanac provides only previous job 
experience for those Senate candidates who were actually elected, it was 
necessary to use both resources to identify those races considered to have a 
“quality challengers” based on prior political experience.
Senate Campaign Intensity is measured in terms of campaign 
expenditures. More specifically, this thesis utilized a cost per voter variable. The 
amount spent through December 31®* of the election year on the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) reports was compared to the number of registered voters in 
each state on Election Day. By dividing the expenditures with the registered 
voters in each state, this determined a cost per voter ratio. This thesis would
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expect to see campaign expenditures as having a significant impact on the 
presidential and Senate state level vote. In addition, it is expected that Senate 
challenger party financial expenditures would have a direct impact on the Senate 
incumbent party financial expenditures as suggested by Jacobsen (2000).
Incumbency has been an important element in political science research. 
Initially, this thesis was designed and the variables coded as either Republican or 
Democrat. After further data collection and the initial analysis, it was determined 
that the variables could be measured properly only by utilizing the incumbent 
party. This was designed to capture the economic macro level effects affecting 
the current administration and Senate campaign. In addition, it was important to 
provide a control variable of Incumbency in Senate elections. By analyzing 
incumbency, this thesis was able to measure the competitiveness and 
differences between marginal races with an incumbent. The information on 
incumbency was gathered from congressional voting records and the FEC data. 
An additional variable to account for the incumbent party advantage was created. 
This information for seat type was coded as 1 for the Senate incumbent of the 
presidential incumbent party and -1 for the Senate challenger of the presidential 
challenger party. A 0 was designated for an open race.
A Senate incumbent whose previous vote share was less than 60%, would 
expect to see a quality challenger emerge for the next election cycle. This study 
created a variable for Marginality, which included only marginal races were within 
60%. Utilizing the Almanac and Congressional Quarterly special reports for each 
election year, this thesis was able to determine the margin of win for incumbent
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candidates prior victories. Marginality was coded by utilizing a trichotomous 
variable. The coding was -1 for a Senate race that was within 10% for the 
incumbent party, 1 if the race was within 10% for the Senate challenger party. If 
there was not a close race, within 10% during the last election, the marginality 
was coded as 0.
As with the presidential model, the Senate Partisanship variable was 
measured as the percent of the incumbent party in the state legislature. As with 
the presidential models, the state level of partisanship is important for Senate 
campaigns. In addition to the above variables, the Senate spillover model also 
included the above measures of Presidential Campaign Activity (the visit data) to 
control for any top down campaign effects from the presidential to the Senate 
contest. As mentioned before when discussing the presidential model, this 
variable is not ideal, but it permits some level of spillover analysis on a state-by- 
state basis.
Causal Model
By utilizing a standard OLS model for the naive and spillover presidential 
and Senate election models, this thesis was able to identify the direct effects of 
the independent variables. However, these models do not account for a more 
sophisticated analysis of the causal process of interest. To account for this, the 
above spillover models were expanded into a causal model format, which allows 
for a more complex path analysis model to be developed. Specifically, this 
technique allows the thesis to examine if the competitiveness of the Senate race.
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in addition to the Senate campaign intensity, influences the state level 
presidential vote.
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analyses used to 
examine the thesis' main concern: under what conditions do Senate elections 
affect the state level vote for the presidency? This chapter begins with an 
overview of the analysis and modeling process and then presents the results 
from the presidential and Senate naive models. The discussion then moves into 
the regression models that specifically examine spillover effects between Senate 
and presidential elections. Finally, the analysis for the causal model is 
presented.
Naïve Model Results 
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics for the presidential naive model 
and Table 5.2 presents the model’s parameter estimates. Turning first to the 
statistics assessing the overall model performance, it appears the inclusion of the 
independent variables makes a significant improvement in predicting the 
dependent variable, incumbent party Presidential State Level Vote. Specifically, 
the value of the F test, 17.639, indicates the inclusion of the independent 
variables makes a significant improvement over the intercept alone. This F value 
is statistically significant beyond the .001 level. The adjusted R^ indicates that
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48.4% of the vote for the incumbent party Presidential State Level Vote is 
captured by the model’s independent variables: Partisanship, Presidential 
Thermometer, Home State Advantage, Unemployment, the Percent Change in 
National Product, and Presidential Campaign Activity. The Standard Error of the 
Estimate is 6.19 indicating predictions in the dependent variable are on average 
off by just over 6%.
Table 5.1 Presidential Naïve Model Summarv
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .717® .513 .484 6.19368
The performance of the coefficients presented in Table 5.2 suggests some 
support for the hypotheses developed above. Specifically, inspection of the 
slope estimates indicates that Partisanship and the Percent o f Change in 
National Product exert strong and significant influence on the dependent 
variable, the Presidential State Level Vote. Prior research suggests that 
economic conditions are strong predictors of presidential performance. As such, 
the performance of the variable on the Presidential State Level Vote may be 
influenced by the economic variables in the model. Surprisingly, Home State 
Advantage is statistically insignificant, suggesting presidential and vice 
presidential candidates do not systematically receive a boost in the vote in their 
home state.
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Turning next to campaign activity, although both variables are in the 
predicted direction, neither obtains conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Challenger Party Presidential Campaign Activity is significant at the .065 level for 
a one-tailed test. Surprisingly, Presidential Campaign Activity, defined as the 
number of times a presidential candidate visited a state from Labor Day through 
Election Day, fails to obtain conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Specifically, the variable is coded as the number of visits made by the incumbent 
and challenger party presidential candidates to each state.
With respect to the less than expected performance of the presidential 
campaign variables, two factors are suspected that may be dampening their 
effect. First, given a larger sample size, the variables may prove to be 
statistically significant. Second, the weak performance also may be a problem in 
measurement rather than theory. As mentioned before, a state level presidential 
campaign expenditure variable would have been a stronger measure.*^ In an 
attempt to determine if the poor statistical performance was a function of 
operationalization, this thesis also modeled the variable similar to Shaw’s work 
(1999a) for the OLS models, from which the data were obtained. Specifically, 
Shaw models visits in terms of the difference in visits between candidates. 
However, when this measure is used, it performs similarly.
Reeves, Chen and Nagano attempted to duplicate Shaw’s work. The Harvard researcher’s 
concluded that when they followed the methods as prescribed in Shaw’s research, they were 
unable to reproduce the substantive claims. Thus, there is still some debate as to the veracity of 
the analysis presented by Shaw (1999a).
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Table 5.2 Presidential Naïve Model
b t
Partisanship 19.483 5.185*
(3.758)
Home State Advantage -2.400 -.984
(2.072)
Unemployment -1.365 -1.989*
(Economy 1) (.686)
National Product 10.027 4.316*
(Economy 2) (2.323)
Presidential Thermometer .401 1.081
(.371)
Presidential Campaign Activity .379 1.089
(IP) (.348)
Presidential Campaign Activity -.491 -1.521
(CP) (.323)
N=127
Table 5.3 presents the summary statistics for the naive Senate model and 
Table 5.4 presents the parameter estimates for the model. Overall, the model 
performed well. The assessment of the F test and statistics suggest that the 
explanatory power of the model is quite strong. Specifically, the value of the F 
test, 28.364, indicates the inclusion of the independent variables makes a 
significant improvement over the intercept alone. This F value is statistically 
significant at the .001 level. The adjusted R  ̂demonstrates that 56.8% of the 
Senate State Level Vote is captured by Incumbency, Challenger Quality, Senate 
Campaign Intensity, Marginality and Partisanship. The Standard Error of the 
Estimate of .08173 indicates that the average prediction error is less than .08% 
suggesting a strong fit between data and theory.
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Table 5.3 Senate Naïve Model Summarv
Model R R Squared
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .767a .588 .568 .08173
More importantly, all the variables in the Senate model are statistically 
significant and in the predicted direction. Interpretation of the parameter 
estimates suggest a good deal of the variation in the Senate vote can be 
explained by factors exogenous to the campaign process as demonstrated by the 
magnitude and significance of Incumbency, Marginality, and Partisanship. For 
every one-unit increase in Partisanship (Incumbent party’s percent of the state 
legislature), the Senate State Level Vote increases by .1%. Similarly, a marginal 
incumbent may, on average, draw nearly 5% less of the vote. Additionally, if a 
marginal incumbent is facing a quality challenger, their share of the vote could be 
reduced an additional 5%.
The analysis also indicates that campaign activity affects the vote in 
Senate elections. The beta weights indicate that the campaign activity of the 
incumbent and challenger party campaigns exert strong substantive effects on 
the Senate State Level vote. Specifically, the standard standardized coefficient 
for the Incumbent Party Senate Campaign Intensity is .288 and the Challenger 
Party Senate Campaign Intensity is -.224. In summary, the Senate naive model 
indicates that both campaign activity and the macro level variables that establish
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the context of a specific race are central to explaining Senate elections 
outcomes. The analysis supports the premise that campaigns do matter.
Table 5.4 Senate Naive Model
b t
Incumbency .132 4.901*
(.027)
Marginality -.047 -2.941*
(.016)
Challenger Quality .045 3.143*
(.014)
Partisanship .102 2.110*
(.048)
Senate Campaign Intensity .018 4.043*
(IP) (.005)
Senate Campaign Intensity -.014 -3.200*
(CP) (.004)
N=127
Spillover Models
The presidential and Senate spillover models provide, which are designed 
to capture the influence that Senate and presidential campaign activity have on 
each other, provide the best test to the hypothesis that campaign activity targeted 
at one race may affect the outcomes of other races occurring simultaneously. 
Table 5.5 presents the presidential spillover model summary and Table 5.6 
presents the results for the presidential spillover model and Table 5.7 and 5.8 
present the model summary statistics and the parameter estimates for the 
Senate spillover models.
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Turning first to Table 5.5, the summary statistics suggest that the 
presidential spillover model, which accounts for Senate Campaign Intensity, 
performs better than the presidential naive model. Specifically, the value of the F 
test, 14.954, indicates the inclusion of the independent variables makes a 
significant improvement over the intercept alone. The F value is significant, 
beyond the .001 level. The adjusted demonstrated 50.3% of the Presidential 
State Level Vote is captured by Partisanship, Presidential Thermometer, Home 
State Advantage, Unemployment, the Percent Change in National Product, 
Presidential Campaign Activity and Senate Campaign Intensity. The Standard 
Error of the Estimate of 6.07960 is a slight improvement over the presidential 
naive model. While the values for these statistics are improvements over the 
naive model, further evidence of an improvement over the presidential naive 
model was demonstrated by performing an F change test.*® This thesis was able 
to conclude the addition of the Senate Campaign Intensity variables to the 
presidential spillover model significantly improved the model at the .05 (p=.04) 
level with an F value of 3.24.
Table 5.5 Summarv of Presidential Spillover Model
Model R R Squared
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 ,734a .539 .503 .607960
The F change test allows one to determine if the inclusion of additional independent variables 
(represented here as the spillover model) results in a statistically significant improvement over the 
reduced model (e.g., the naive models).
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Similar to the presidential naive model, Partisanship, Unemployment, and 
the Percent Change in National Product are highly significant, allowing the null 
hypothesis for these variables to be rejected. As discussed before, the Senate 
Campaign Intensity v/as added to this model to assess the spillover effects from 
the Senate campaign to the presidential campaign. Incumbent Party Senate 
Campaign Intensity proved to be statistically significant at the .005 level. This 
campaign variable provides the best evidence for the main argument that Senate 
campaigns can affect the vote for president. The beta weights indicate that 
Incumbent Party Senate Campaign Intensity exerts substantive effects on the 
Presidential State Level Vote. Specifically, the standard standardized coefficient 
for the lncuml)ent Party Senate Campaign Intensity is .175.
The Challenger Party Senate Campaign Intensity showed a significance 
level of .06 for a one-tailed test. The performance of the challenger variable is 
not at all surprising given that incumbents spend in response to the challenger. 
This is primarily due to the notion that incumbents increase their spending in 
response to the spending of challengers. Thus, the measure of the Senate 
Campaign Intensity is what happens before they react to the challenger.
As with the original model, and probably for the same reasons. Table 5.6 
illustrates how Home State Advantage and Presidential Thermometer Ratings 
failed to reach statistical significance. In addition, the Presidential Campaign 
Activity did not demonstrate significance. Challenger Party Presidential 
Campaign Activity approaches conventional levels of significance (p=-.07). As 
mentioned before, Shaw’s variable may not be the best measurement of
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presidential campaign activity. Ideally, the variable that would have been used 
here would measure the total dollars spent by each presidential campaign in 
each state.
Table 5.6 Presidential Spillover Model
b t
Partisanship 18.522 4.930*
(3.757)
Home State Advantage 1.467 .704
(2.085)
Unemployment (Economy 1) -1.409 -2.087*
(.675)
Percent Change in National 10.080 4.387*
Product (2.298)
(Economy 2)
Presidential Thermometer .358 .975
(.367)
Presidential Campaign Activity .393 1.149
(IP) (.342)
Presidential Campaign Activity -.467 -1.451
(CP) (.322)
Senate Campaign Intensity .763 2.429*
(IP) (.314)
Senate Campaign Intensity -.471 -1.525
(CP) (.309)
N=127
Table 5.7 presents the summary statistics for the Senate spillover model 
summary and Table 5.8 presents the parameter estimates for the Senate 
spillover model. As was the case with the presidential models, the summary 
statistics for the spillover model suggest some improvement in the model 
performance as compared to the Senate naive model. Specifically, the F value
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of 21.494 indicates the inclusion of the independent variables makes a significant 
improvement over the intercept along. The F Value is significant performing at 
the .001 level. The adjusted demonstrates 57.1% of the Senate State Level 
Vote is captured by Incumbency, Challenger Quality, Senate Campaign Intensity, 
Marginality, Partisanship, and Presidential Campaign Activity.
Table 5.7 Summarv of Senate Spillover Model
Model R R Squared
Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 774a .599 .571 .08175
The Standard Error of the Estimate of .08175 indicates that the average 
prediction error is less than .08%, again suggesting a strong fit between data and 
theory. However, while the spillover model did perform well, the F change test, 
which compares if the inclusion of the additional independent variables 
significantly improves the model, is statistically insignificant. That is, the 
inclusion of Presidential Campaign Activity variables did not statistically improve 
the overall performance of the model at the .05 (p=.20) level with an F value of 
1.591068. This is most likely the case because the additional variables 
themselves. Presidential Campaign Activity, were statistically insignificant.
As with the Senate naive model, all of the independent variables are 
statistically significant and in the predicted direction for the spillover model. As 
such, the parameter estimates suggest that the statewide Senate vote can be
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accounted for by factors both exogenous to the actual campaign, as well as by 
campaign activity. Specifically, the magnitude of the estimates for Incumbency, 
Marginality and Partisanship indicate strong substantive effects. Moreover, 
inspection of the model’s beta weights, indicate that Incumbency make a larger 
contribution in predicting the variance in the dependent variable as compared to 
Marginality (Incumbency = .522; Marginality = -.245J.
At the same time, the beta weights also indicate that the campaign activity 
of the incumbent and challenger party campaigns exert strong substantive effects 
on the vote. Specifically, the standard standardized coefficients for the 
Incumbent Party Senate Campaign Intensity is .284, -.211 for the Challenger 
Party Senate Campaign Intensity, and .224 for Challenger Quality. However, as 
was the case with the presidential spillover model, neither of the variables taping 
presidential campaign activity performed as expected.
Specifically, although the Challenger Party Presidential Campaign Activity 
and Incumbent Party Presidential Campaign Activity are in the predicted 
direction, both fail to obtain conventional levels of statistical significance. The 
results indicate that presidential campaign activity (measured in terms of visits) 
does not exert a direct influence on the Senate vote.
^®Prior work examining presidential coattails generally has not modeled the relationship between 
presidential and congressional election outcomes by directly assessing the influence of 
presidential campaign activity on individual Senate and House races. Rather, this research tends 
to account for coattails by simply comparing the aggregate election outcomes of presidential and 
congressional elections. As such, the findings presented here bring into question the underlying 
causal mechanism asserted by the coattails literature.
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Table 5.8 Senate Spillover Model
b T
Incumbency .136 4.997*
(.027)
Marginality -.046 -2.845*
(.016)
Challenger Quality .044 3.015*
(.015)
Partisanship .117 2.371*
(.049)
Senate Campaign Intensity (IP) .018 3.935*
(.005)
Senate Campaign Intensity -.013 -2.940*
(CP) (.004)
Presidential Campaign (IP) .006 1.298
(.005)
Presidential Campaign (CP) -.004 -1.013
(004)
N=127
This model supports the research that campaigns matter. Challenger 
Quality and Incumbent Party Campaign Intensity resulted in higher standardized 
coefficients (beta weight) than Partisanship. This would suggest that campaign 
effects are important considerations when explaining the Senate State Level 
Vote. In summary, the Senate spillover model indicates both campaign activity 
and the context of the race are central to Senate election outcomes.
Causal Model
The above models provide some support for the thesis’ primary contention 
that Senate campaign intensity affects the statewide vote for president. At the 
same time, these analyses are largely static and as such, are unable to capture 
the nature of a causal process that unfolds over time. To capture this aspect of
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the process of interest, this thesis applies causal modeling techniques to the 
data. These techniques allow one to assess the direct and indirect influences 
within a system of variables. By analyzing the multiple variables occurring during 
the campaign process simultaneously, this thesis follows the growing number of 
campaign and election studies that focus on the multi-layered dynamics that are 
present in the campaign process such as Kahn and Kenney (1997), Damore 
(2004), and Nicholson (2005).
As is customary with causal modeling, the beta weights are used to 
assess both direct and indirect paths.^° The actual estimation process involves 
first specifying the paths among the independent variables and dependent 
variables to capture the underlying causal process. Figure 5.1 presents a 
schematic of the causal process without the estimates. The causal model is 
designed to assess if the competitiveness of the Senate race, in addition to the 
Senate campaign influences tested by the OLS Models, influence the dependent 
variable, the Presidential State Level Vote. The causal model variables had 
several modifications from the OLS Models. First, Home State Advantage and 
Presidential Thermometer were deleted from the causal model after failing to 
reach statistical significance in the presidential spillover model. Additionally, 
based on the high correlated values of the Presidential Campaign Activity 
variables (.803), the causal model used the difference in visits as reflected in 
Shaw’s (1999a) original data. Lastly, Seat Type was included to account for the 
Senate incumbency advantage as determined by the presidential incumbent
Beta weights are the standardized coefficients, allowing one to make comparisons in the 
magnitudes of variables that are measured using different metrics.
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party. These modifications permitted this model to capture both the direct and 
indirect relationships among the variables to provide a more complex analysis of 
the causal process.
Figure 5.1
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Figure 5.2 presents the standardized coefficients of the causal model 
displaying the magnitudes of the paths suggested before. Specifically, as shown 
in Figure 5.2, this modeling process generated 16 separate regression equations 
to capture both the direct and indirect effects on the variables. Turning to the 
paths, the results suggest that the Presidential State Level Vote was influenced 
by Unemployment, the Percent Change in National Product, Partisanship, and 
the Senate State Level Vote. The Presidential Campaign Activity showed
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significance only at the .06 level. Challenger Party Presidential Campaign 
Activity was directly related to the activities of the Incumbent Party Presidential 
Campaign Activity, with a correlation of .803. This finding was consistent with the 
prior work of Shaw (1999b). His study focused on a variety of effects affect 
presidential messages. More importantly, he demonstrates how the presidential 
challenger reacts to those campaign related events and messages to shape and 
mobilize his own support. It also follows that both competing presidential 
candidates tend to concentrate their resources in the same states. Based on this 
information, the variable was modified for the causal model to reflect the 
difference in campaign intensity.
The causal model provides support that campaigns do matter and Senate 
campaigns can affect the presidential vote. While Campbell’s (1992, 2000) 
argument that macro-level factors are important proves true under this analysis, 
this causal model also demonstrates the relevance of campaigns.
Unemployment has a direct effect on Challenger Party Senate Campaign 
Intensity as expected, but failed to demonstrate statistical significance directly 
with Quality Challenger. This suggests that consistent with the literature, macro 
level variables have an effect on the ability of a challenger to effectively 
challenge the incumbent. As discussed in chapter four, Quality Challenger was 
coded as 1 for an incumbent party challenger with previous experience, -1 for a 
challenger party with previous experience and was coded with 0 if neither 
candidate had experience or if both candidates had experience. As suggested in 
earlier chapters, this variable was not performing as expected and may be one
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Figure 5.2
Causal Model 
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explanation as to why the direct effect was not captured. Another presidential 
campaign variable should be developed for additional work. Still, the results from 
the macro level variable of Unemployment on the Presidential State Level Vote 
and Challenger Party Senate Campaign Intensity supports the work of Holbrook 
and Campbell. However, more important for this research is these results 
support the work of Jacobsen and Kernall (1981) who suggest that these 
variables work to benefit strategic politicians. That is, they serve as the backdrop 
to help determine if a specific campaign will have a quality challenger who can 
mount the financial resources to challenge an incumbent. Additionally, 
considering both indirect and direct effects, this model supports the research of
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Jacobsen (1987) that suggests Senate incumbent spending is directly related to 
challenger spending. This had a significance level of ,000. The standardized 
coefficient was .450, which indicates that this is a strong predictor.
The Senate State Level Vote seems to be directly affected by Seat Type^\ 
Marginality, Senate Campaign Intensity, Challenger Quality and Partisanship.
The Seat Type was strong with a beta weight of .514. That is, Incumbency 
exerts strong substantive effects on the Senate State Level Vote. Interestingly, 
the Partisanship variable had a stronger effect on the Presidential State level 
vote than on the Senate State Level Vote. The effect of Partisanship on the 
presidential vote was .297, while the effect of Partisanship on the Senate vote 
was .153. Table 5.9 provides the results of the estimates used to generate the 
causal analysis.
Consistent with the results presented in Figure 5.2, these effects suggest 
that macro level variables and campaign activity affect both the state level vote 
for president and Senate.^^ More importantly, the path analysis suggests that the 
campaign activities at one level can no longer be considered in isolation. In 
summary, the above has presented the statistical analysis used to examine this 
thesis’ main concern: under what conditions do Senate elections affect the state 
level vote for the presidency?
21 Seat type variable was included in the causal model to capture the White House Incumbent
party Senate Incumbency advantage.
The Senate State Level Vote demonstrated statistical significance when the Senate Campaign 
Intensity variables were included and when they were excluded. Conversely, the Senate 
Campaign Intensity variables demonstrated statistical significance only when the State Level 
Senate Vote was not included. (Incumbent Party Senate Campaign Intensity significance level 
was reduced to of .07)
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Table 5.9 Causal Analyses Results
Senate State Level Vote -  Incumbent Party beta b t Sig.
Senate Campaign -  IP .237 .015 3.422 .000
(.004)
Senate Campaign -  CP -.193 -.012 -2.874 .002
(.004)
Marginality .121 .022 1.867 .032
(.012)
Seat Type .514 .072 6.128 .000
(.012)
Quality Challenger .200 .039 6.081 .000
(.014)
Partisanship 153 121 3.044 .003
(.046)
Presidential State Level Vote -  Incumbent Party
National Product .559 11.791 8.696 .000
(1.356)
Presidential Campaign Activity .095 -.464 1.527 .06
(.304)
Unemployment -.284 -1.944 4.425 .000
(.439)
Partisanship .297 16.296 4.283 .000
(3.805)
Senate State Level Vote .193 13.417 2.935 .002
(4.571)
Senate Campaign Intensity -  Incumbent Party
Senate Campaign Intensity -  CP .450 .434 5.824 .000
(.075)
Quality Challenger 253 .778 3.268 .001
(.238)
Senate Campaign Intensity -  Challenger Party
Unemployment -.167 -.268 -1.921 .027
(.140)
After presenting the results of the naive models that do not consider 
spillover campaign effects, the analysis moved to an assessment of the spillover 
effects between the Senate and presidential campaigns. It is the spillover 
models that provide the best evidence for the thesis’ main contention.
Specifically, the presidential model was significantly improved with the inclusion 
of the Senate Campaign Intensity suggesting that activity at one level may 
benefit up ticket races. The chapter concluded by presenting the causal analysis
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that seeks to examine if the competitiveness of the Senate race, measured in 
terms of the vote... positively affects the state level vote for the presidency. The 
conclusion of this analysis is that the Senate vote influences the vote for 
President through campaigns and competitive elections.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters explore the inter-relationship between the state 
level Senate and presidential campaigns. The specific hypothesis questioned 
whether competitive Senate elections with a high level of campaign intensity 
provide a positive affect for the presidential candidate in the same political party. 
To answer this question, this thesis developed theoretical models that accounts 
for spillover effects among campaigns at different levels.
The initial naive models provided a baseline from which to compare the 
spillover models. That is, this thesis considered the impact in terms of each 
election in isolation. From there, each election was considered in terms of being 
affected or having spillover effects from other campaigns. By then creating a 
causal model, this research was able to provide a clearer picture of the causal 
process of interest. As such, these findings serve to illustrate the 
interdependence of local, national, and macro-level variables that impact 
elections.
The results presented here suggest that presidential and Senate elections 
are influenced by macro level factors as well as the campaign events. This 
supports the work of Campbell (2000) and Holbrook (1991) who suggest macro 
level factors are important. However, in slight contrast to Campbell, who
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suggests that campaigns are not significant, this study suggests that campaigns 
can matter. For example, in the causal model where all variables were 
standardized. Partisanship showed a beta weight of .153 on the Senate State 
Level Vote, while Senate Incumbent Campaign Intensity performed at .237. This 
shows the effect of campaign activity may be stronger than Partisanship. 
Campaign effects could be more important because they are changeable. For 
example, it would be easier to increase campaign activity or target a high 
performing precinct than it would be to change a macro level variable such as the 
national unemployment rate. However, this being said, a change in campaign 
tactics would be effective only when the macro level variables supported a 
competitive election and the emergence of a quality challenger.
Both the macro level variables of Unemployment and the Percent Change 
in National Product had direct effects on the Presidential State Level Vote. In 
addition. Unemployment had a direct effect on the Senate Challenger Campaign 
activity. This multi-level affects of the economic macro level variables on both 
the Senate and presidential variables underscores the importance of analyzing 
all of the various effects that each variable may have on another. This study 
further suggests that macro level and campaign effects cannot be evaluated in 
isolation from one another. This research confirms prior work such as Jacobsen 
(2000), who emphasizes the importance of considering various interactions 
between national factors and campaign activity.
As mentioned earlier, there is considerable research that suggests that 
campaigns matter (Kahn and Kenny, 1999; Shaw, 1999b; Westlye, 1983;
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Holbrook, 1994; Damore, 2004). This same research highlights the importance 
of campaigns, specifically when there is a quality challenger in a competitive 
election. The results presented suggest that a quality challenger is central to a 
competitive election. This study has found support for Jacobsen and Kernall’s 
(1981 ) research on the impact and importance of quality challengers. Quality 
Challengers were shown to have a strong, direct effect on Senate Incumbent 
Campaign Intensity and the Senate State Level Vote. Additionally, Marginality 
had a direct effect on Senate State Level Vote. This supports Stewart’s (1989) 
research regarding the importance of the relationship between marginality and 
quality challengers.
Competitive Senate elections with well-financed quality challengers 
appear to have a direct impact on the Presidential State Level Vote. The Senate 
State Level Vote has a direct effect on the Presidential State Level Vote. 
Incumbency proved to be significant in almost every case, supporting the prior 
research of Campbell and Sumners (1990) and Calvert & Ferejohn (1983).
In addition to incumbency, the factor of money in campaigns still seems to 
be a highly consistent indicator of competitive elections. The amount of money 
necessary to engage the media and the voting public remains significant. The 
measure of 2:1 utilized in this study and by Westlye (1991, 1993) proves to be a 
reliable indicator. Campaign spending and the spending by political parties can 
influence the competitiveness of a campaign. The increase and amount of 
money being spent in a political environment increases the likelihood the voting 
public will be engaged in the contest (Nicholson, 2003).
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The results of this research provide an initial insight into the multi-level 
nature of the campaign process, but would need to be refined to include a more 
precise measure of Presidential Campaign Activity and Partisanship. While most 
results were consistent with theoretical expectations, there were limitations with 
the data that did not allow a more detailed analysis of presidential campaign 
activity. Due to data limitations of the Presidential Campaign Activity variable, 
this study was not able to capture whether or not there was a direct coattail 
relationship from the presidency to the Senate (although prior presidential coattail 
studies support that claim). As mentioned before, having a presidential 
campaign variable that can accurately assess the financial expenditures on a 
state-by-state basis may help to answer the question more thoroughly.
Another limitation of this study is the sample size. Although this thesis 
initially planned to utilize every Senate election from 1976-2000 (as discussed in 
chapter four), the information prior to the 1990s is not readily accessible. With 
the conclusion of the 2004 election cycle, the next step in this research process 
would be to include those samples in the case study to test consistency.
This study can be applied to practical uses and understanding. Based on 
the results, Senate candidates may have a clearer understanding as to when the 
right time would be to run for elected office. It is important to recognize the 
challenges facing those running for election. The guidelines for political parties to 
select viable candidates may be better identified. This could assist in putting 
limited resources to better use. Lastly, nominees and presidential candidates 
may pay closer attention to Senate elections in states that are swing or open for
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the next presidential election. If Senate elections can affect the presidency, as 
this study suggests, then it would be important for national committees not to limit 
their scope of resources to national elections for president.
The purpose of this research is to provide an advancement of our 
understanding into the factors that influence the vote for president. The 
dynamics of local considerations cannot be minimized. That is, election studies 
need to take into account the bigger picture in the election process. The results 
presented here suggest there is empirical support for a relationship that only has 
been mentioned slightly in previous research and dismissed.
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